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Social partners in Spain have since the early 1980s worked to consolidate strong collective 
coordination capacities. Particularly important in this regard have been the efforts since the 
mid 1990s to strengthen collective bargaining at sectoral level to consolidate a top-down 
mechanism of organized de-centralization. Peak bi-partite agreements on collective 
bargaining, conflict resolution and lifelong learning have also contributed to these goals. The 
article first of all shows the difficulties to develop autonomous coordination mechanisms in a 
context of significant statutory regulation of industrial relations and permanent threat of 
unilateral state regulation. Moreover, it is also argued how in the case of Spain, the state does 
not only supplement the coordination deficit of social partners but very often substitutes 
them. The reform trajectory since the 1990s is accordingly characterized by the lack of 
institutionalized social dialogue and hence the discretionary intervention of the state in critical 
junctures as developments in the Great Recession shows. Social partners, in a Sisyphus like 
process, have to rebuild their self-regulatory capacities and adapt to the new framework 







The sovereign debt crisis not only has led to the implementation of far reaching fiscal austerity 
packages in the peripheral countries of the Eurozone, but it has also triggered significant 
reforms of labour market and industrial relations institutions. Labour law reforms 
implemented in many EU countries during the 2010-2013 period have been justified by the 
argument that, irrespective of the causes of the crisis, making labour markets more flexible is 
the best response and will guarantee a softer landing for future economic downturns 
(European Commission 2010). Relying on this reasoning, changes in labour laws in Southern 
Europe and Ireland have involved far-reaching modifications of labour codes (Clauwaert and 
Schömann, 2012), including further moves towards decentralisation of collective bargaining, 
easy firing processes etc. This has been accompanied by a downsizing of the welfare state 
(Heise and Lierse, 2011) with particularly significant impacts in unemployment benefit 
systems, old age pensions but also active labour market programmes. Higher labour market 
flexibility was thus combined with significant cuts in social protection in a number of countries, 
which has ‘de facto’ meant the abandonment of the ‘flexicurity’ paradigm in these countries 
(Heyes 2013).  
 
The political and economic context where reforms have occurred has certainly been propitious 
to the abandonment of tripartite social dialogue (Regini and Pedersini 2013, Molina and 
Miguélez 2013). The explicit or implicit exogenous imposition of these reforms on 
governments under strong pressure to comply with certain fiscal requirements, has led in 
many cases to push forward reforms of the labour market or industrial relations without even 
having negotiated them with social partners. The general impression is that executives feel 
they’re no longer accountable to their citizens but to international organisations and as a 
consequence, there is no need to look for the domestic legitimacy provided by social partners. 
In other words, there is no space for domestic social dialogue under the technocratic model of 
macroeconomic management imposed on member states. 
 
Even though Spain was not officially under the assistance program and supervision of the 
Troika, the reforms undertaken in this country have been as far reaching as in the 
Memorandum countries. Shortly before the executive headed by Mariano Rajoy announced a 
new labour market reform in 10 February 2012, the finance ministry re-assured mr. C. Juncker 
at an Ecofin meeting in Brussels that the changes in labour market regulations would be 
“extremely aggressive” (El Pais 2012). A leader of the main employer organization in Spain 
affirmed that it was the most profound reform since the 1978 constitution was approved, and 
expected to be very useful in order to create new jobs and reduce the unemployment rate. 
The reform was approved without having maintained any dialogue with social partners, and it 
didn’t take into account the agreement signed just some days before by trade unions and 
employer organizations that contained a wide range of measures, including mechanisms to 
introduce higher degrees of flexibility in collective bargaining. The way in which the reform 
was passed, together with its content has led some authors to talk of a de-constitutionalization 
of work (Baylos 2013). 
 
The unilateral change in labour market regulations and collective bargaining in Spain does not 
however constitute a novelty (Bentolila 2013). There have been at least three more occasions 
since the return to democracy where the Spanish executive has regulated without previously 
reaching a consensus with social partners. However, there are two aspects that make this 
latest episode different from previous ones. First, preceding unilateral reforms of industrial 
relations and the labour market had been preceded by negotiations among social partners that 
failed to reach an agreement. Secondly, the reform goes well beyond the employers’ historical 
claim of further collective bargaining decentralization and enhances the capacity of employers 
to unilaterally modify employees’ working conditions by opting out of the clauses contained in 
collective agreements. In other words, the reform erodes the protective capacity of collective 
bargaining in Spain.  
 
As a country belonging to the so-called Mixed Market Economies group within varieties of 
capitalism, it is been argued how social partners lack the organizational and coordination 
capacities necessary in order to build complementarieties across institutional domains (Molina 
and Rhodes 2007). These institutional deficiencies were particularly worrying in the context of 
Monetary Integration, as they left the country’s economy in a vulnerable position before the 
requirements of the Euro (Hassel 2007). In order to overcome these weaknesses, the state in 
these countries has played a compensating role in order to strengthen the position and 
capacities of socio-economic actors (Royo 2006). However, this supplementary intervention 
constitutes an unstable equilibrium as it very often undermines the incentives actors have to 
invest in specific assets, whilst opening the door to a discretionary use of state’s legitimate 
capacities to govern a specific policy field. Institutional developments in MMEs are accordingly 
more sensitive to exogenous development as well as highly dependent on the political system 
and the veto power capacity of domestic actors.  
 
Developments in industrial relations in Spain are a clear example of the contradictions 
inherent to MMEs. Social partners, and trade unions in particular, have worked to consolidate 
strong autonomous collective bargaining institutions. Particularly important in this regard have 
been the efforts since the mid 1990s to strengthen collective bargaining at sectoral level to 
consolidate a top-down mechanism of organized de-centralisation. Peak bi-partite agreements 
on collective bargaining, conflict resolution and lifelong learning have also contributed to 
enhance coordination and autonomous governance of industrial relations. The article first of 
all shows the difficulties to develop autonomous coordination mechanisms in a context of 
significant statutory regulation of industrial relations and permanent threat of unilateral state 
regulation. Moreover, it is also argued how in the case of Spain, the state does not only 
supplement the coordination deficit of social partners but very often substitutes them. The 
reform trajectory since the 1990s is accordingly characterized by the lack of institutionalized 
social dialogue and hence the discretionary intervention of the state in critical junctures. Social 
partners, in a Sisyphus like process, have to rebuild their autonomous regulatory capacities 
and adapt to the new framework imposed by the state. 
 
The paper is structured in four sections. The first section shortly discusses the role and 
characteristics of industrial relations in Mixed Market Economies using the Varieties of 
Capitalism framework. Section two provides a general overview of the evolution and 
characteristics of industrial relations in Spain. Two aspects are paid particular attention: 
changes in the structure of collective bargaining and the regulatory intervention of the state. 
Section III then moves into the recent period of economic crisis and austerity policies. A 
discussion of the main developments on industrial relations and social dialogue is 
complemented with a focus on the two aspects analysed in section II. Finally, section IV 





Section I. Industrial Relations and Institutional Change in Mixed Market Economies 
 
Some consensus has been built in recent years around the state being the defining trait of the 
political economies of Southern Europe (Amable 2003, Schmidt 2003, Molina and Rhodes 
2007). Even though disagreement persists as to its role and significance, it is acknowledged 
how state coordination constitutes another important form of coordination alongside the 
market and strategic types found in LMEs and CMEs respectively. In these countries, the state 
supplements the coordination failures of socio-economic actors, thus supporting and 
enhancing their strategic capacity. 
 
Functional explanations have occupied a central role in the debates about state’s role in 
industrial relations (Molina 2014). Common to all these explanations is the idea that state 
intervention will be inversely related to the coordination capacity of other non-state actors 
and their capacity to create institutions that support companies’ competitiveness. In the 
specific case of MMEs of Southern Europe, Gerschenkron (1962) noted how heavier state 
regulation in Southern Europe contributed to consolidate markets in countries where the late 
industrialization had hindered the consolidation of an adequate regulatory framework for the 
consolidation of capitalism. In the specific case of industrial relations, Howell (2001) notes 
more recently how the state plays a particular important role in moments of change and re-
negotiation of industrial relations. Confirmatory evidence of Howell’s insights came with the 
experience of concertation and social pacts (Hancke and Rhodes 2005; Hassel 2007). These 
experiences made clear how in countries lacking the institutional and organizational 
preconditions for successful concertation and adaptation to the requirements of EMU, the 
state provided a favourable ground for tripartite negotiations.  
 
Within the functional approach, Varieties of Capitalism contains two main implications for the 
study of differences and changes in the role of the state in industrial relations. First, this role 
differs according to the needs of the specific variety of capitalism we observe. Thus in those 
countries where both market and non-market (strategic) coordination mechanisms are weak, 
the state will be particularly present in industrial relations (Hassel 2007). A second implication 
refers to the pace and direction of change. Following VoC, we can expect institutional change 
in pure LMEs and CMEs to be incremental and self-referential in order to maintain existing 
complementarities (Hall and Thelen 2009). Moreover, we can expect the state to play a 
secondary / monitoring role. This means that the differences we observe across countries 
regarding the role of the state in industrial relations will persist, or at maximum will adapt to 
gradual transformations in the form of capitalism dominant in the economy. However, in 
MMEs change will be more responsive to exogenous shocks and contingent upon government 
colour and the veto power of other actors. Thus two aspects make the institutional 
equilibriums in MMEs inherently weak. The first one is that in its supplementary role, state 
intervention does not necessarily contribute to enhance existing institutional 
complementarities or deliver new ones. This implies, following the VoC logic, that institutional 
equilibriums in MMEs will fail to create / generate actors’ incentives to invest in specific skills 
and/or develop institutions capable of locking in actors’ strategies. As a consequence, MMEs 
will be characterized by higher degrees of institutional instability and state’s role will be a 
hindrance for socio-economic actors to autonomously develop non-market forms of 
coordination.  
 
In the case of Spain, the consolidation of democratic institutions and the opening up of spaces 
for autonomous self-regulation and interaction amongst social partners characterized 
industrial relations developments since the early 1980s. However, this process has been 
characterized by a comparatively higher degree of state intervention in order to overcome 
some of the coordination problems among social partners that appeared in the early years of 
the return to democracy. This is a differentiating trait of the Mediterranean or Mixed Variety 
of Capitalism (Amable 2006; Molina and Rhodes 2007). In return for cooperation in the early 
stages, the state has very often provided institutional compensations to social partners and 
especially trade unions, including their participation in public decision-making, extension 
mechanisms for collective bargaining, etc. As a result of these, social partners have acquired 
political veto powers that by far exceed their real influence in terms of membership or 
company level representation. Moreover, a production structure that makes it difficult to 
reach many of the workplaces by unions has hindered the development of a strong bargaining 
coordination. Laws extending collective agreements have accordingly played a key role in 
governing industrial relations.  
 
The instability and political contingency of industrial relations has become clear in the context 
of the recent economic crisis where unilateral state rulings have been the norm and social 
partners have played a marginal role in governing change in spite of having reached important 
agreements. One of the arguments used by executives to intervene has been precisely the 
weakness of self-regulatory mechanisms to provide profound and effective responses in a 




Section 2. Industrial Relations in Spain: Characteristics and Evolution 
 
In order to better assess the relevance of changes occurred during the crisis, this section 
summarises the main stages in the evolution of industrial relations in Spain. Two episodes are 
particularly important in this evolution; the 1994 reform imposed by the Socialist government 
in the middle of the economic crisis and the 1997 interconfederal agreement in the run-up to 
EMU. Moreover, two characteristics of the industrial relations framework receive particular 
attention because of their significance: the regulatory role of the state and the multi-level 
collective bargaining structure. The analysis of these two key aspects will contribute to shed 
light into the most recent developments. 
 
Even though there is a clear discontinuity between the Franco dictatorship and the democracy 
when it comes to industrial relations, two important aspects of the authoritarian system need 
to be considered in order to understand later developments.  First of all, state control of the 
employment relation through extensive regulation of collective bargaining as well as 
employees’ rights and working conditions. Even though some attempts at liberalization 
occurred in the last years of the dictatorship, the new democratic industrial relations edifice 
opened new spaces for autonomous regulation by employers and trade unions. But the state 
still regulated very intensively many aspects of the employment relationship and maintained a 
pervasive role (Del Rey and Falguera 1999). This became clear with the 1980 Workers’ Statute 
(Estatuto de los Trabajadores) that contained very detailed procedural and substantive 
regulations of industrial relations and collective bargaining more specifically.  
 
One of the explanations for the significant statutory regulation of industrial relations in Spain is 
precisely the need to create ‘ex novo’ an institutional framework that would make for the 
organisational weaknesses of social partners. In particular, the late consolidation of employers 
associations, together with the weak organisational articulation of trade unions, would have 
made it extremely difficult to develop autonomous collective bargaining in the early years of 
democracy without significant regulatory support. Moreover, social partners in the transition 
years lacked the trust necessary to develop adequate collective bargaining at all levels of the 
bargaining structure. The existence of a legal framework contributed to enhance the 
predictability of social partners’ behaviour hence allowing repeated interactions and by 
implication, building trust amongst them.  
 
This process should contribute to the gradual extension of self-regulation. However, the 
regulatory edifice became the main obstacle in this process and contributed to perpetuate the 
traditional organizational weaknesses of social partners in Spain. The regulatory characteristics 
of the industrial relations system became also under attack from all actors in the late 1980s. 
For trade unions, an excessive statutory regulation of industrial relations hampered the vitality 
and scope of collective bargaining. The automatic and mandatory extension of collective 
agreements and a dual structure of workers' representation reduced union membership and 
provided incentives to win votes rather than members. CEOE was also very critical of statutory 
regulation of industrial relations in Spain that introduced excessive rigidities in collective 
bargaining. Moreover, in their view this also explained the problems encountered to develop 
innovative forms of collective self-regulation and conflict resolution.  
 
The second characteristic of industrial relations in Spain is the existence of a multi-level 
bargaining structure, with a historically weak articulation between levels (Martin Artiles and 
Alos Moner 2003). In the early years after the transition to democracy, collective bargaining 
occurred at several levels, with negotiations at territorial (privincial) sector level being the 
most significant in terms of workers covered. However, negotiations took place at several 
instances, and the issues were very often re-negotiated at lower levels, hence leading to 
cascading negotiations. The hierarchy principle in the Workers’ Statute made it very difficult 
for company level agreements to lower the conditions negotiated at higher level. Peak 
agreements in the early 1980s contributed to maintain a formally high level of centralization, 
but after its abandonment since the mid 1980s, a process of gradual de-centralization occurred 
due to the lack of a clear articulation between bargaining levels. Bargaining took place at 
several levels, but the main bargaining locus became the sector at provincial level (Del Rey 
2003). The limited presence of unions at enterprise level hindered the efficacy of collective 
negotiations at higher levels because only occasionally they affected workers in small and 
medium-sized establishments. As a consequence of the above, collective bargaining was very 
sensitive to changes in the strategies, preferences and power of actors, hence lacking stability 
and becoming a source of permanent conflict, as showed by the comparatively high conflict 
rates.  
 
Before this situation, both trade unions and employers converged on the need to reform 
collective bargaining, but they nonetheless differed on the strategy to be followed. Whilst 
trade unions wanted to strengthen national sector agreements establishing clear rules for 
lower level agreements, employers’ confederation CEOE heralded a simplification of 
bargaining levels, regulations and procedures, preferably through the elimination of higher-
level bargaining instances.  
 
The problems encountered to reach consensus around the direction of industrial relations 
reform became clear in the context of the early 1990s crisis and the adjustment required 
meeting the Maastricht criteria. The Socialist government tried several times to negotiate an 
agreement on wage moderation and the reform of the labour market (including collective 
bargaining), but failed on every attempt. It then passed unilaterally a bill aimed at promoting 
employment and including an important reform of the Workers’ Statute. One of its most 
important aspects was the extension in the use of opting out clauses that contributed to 
enhance the regulatory role of company level bargaining. The decentralisation of collective 
bargaining based on the extension of these clauses adopted a disorganised character. Trade 
unions criticised very strongly the reform and the fact that the government had unilaterally 
regulated on aspects reserved to the collective autonomy of social partners (Martínez Abascal 
1995). 
 
Trade unions learnt from this episode that the passive defence of the status quo was no longer 
a viable and safe course of action because the government had made credible its threat of 
unilateral regulation. Their only alternative was to counteract the dynamics opened with the 
reform by strengthening collective bargaining and social dialogue with employer organizations 
in order to build new consensus and bi-partite institutions. As a consequence, a new process of 
social dialogue started soon after the unilateral reform and delivered the 1997 agreements on 
collective bargaining and the labour market: the AIEE (Agreement on Employment Stability), 
AICV (Agreement on the Extension of Collective Bargaining) and AINC (Agreement on Collective 
Bargaining). The AICV helped to speed up and give greater coherence to the substitution of the 
Labour Ordinances by collective agreements. The AINC focused exclusively on the reform of 
collective bargaining processes and structure. 
 
These agreements marked a turning point regarding both collective bargaining structure as 
well as the regulation of industrial relations. First, they emphasise the idea of enhancing the 
regulatory role of national sector agreements in two different ways. First, agreements at this 
level have competence over a series of issues which cannot be (re-) negotiated at lower levels. 
This is because trade unions wanted to retain control over a series of issues in order to 
guarantee higher uniformity and minimum employment standards. Secondly, the national 
sector would establish guidelines and recommendations for lower level negotiations. 
Accordingly, the 1997 agreement promoted a top-down, organised form of de-centralisation 
through the recovery of bargaining power of national federations whilst preserving firms' 
capacity to adapt the conditions set at higher levels to their specific needs (Sanguineti 
1999).This contrasts with the bottom-updisorganised de-centralisation model imposed by the 
government in 1994. 
 
When it comes to industrial relations regulation, the 1997 agreement opened up a new period 
of strengthened social dialogue in Spain and provided the basis for creating and consolidating 
bi-partite institutions at sectoral level, including employment observatories, conflict resolution 
mechanisms and lifelong learning strategies. In this way, trade unions and employer 
organisations promoted the shift away from the old statist government of industrial relations. 
Even though the effective impact of the reform on collective bargaining was less significant 
than initially envisaged by social partners, it nonetheless made clear their determination to 
autonomously govern industrial relations. Finally, the reform had a very important symbolic 
value as the Spanish economy was those years in the final stages in the run-up to the Euro. 
With this agreement, social partners made clear their commitment to contribute to the low 
inflation target and prepare collective bargaining institutions to the new framework (Perez 
2000). 
 
The momentum of bi-partite social dialogue became clear in 2001, when the centre-right 
government and social partners started negotiations for a reform of collective bargaining. 
Government proposals’ differed from those by trade unions in significant ways and threatened 
social partners to impose it. However, some weeks later an agreement between unions and 
employers was finally signed -the so-called AINC 2002. Even though the agreement did not 
introduce reforms in the structure of collective bargaining and limited its content to joint 
guidelines for developing collective bargaining in 2001, it nonetheless showed the 
determination of unions and employers to avoid external state interference in regulating 
industrial relations. The AINC was re-negotiated on an annual basis until 2008, hence 
consolidating a move away from a weak system of collective bargaining with strong state and 
legal interferences towards a new form of governance of industrial relations, characterised by 








As pointed out in section II, previous to the Great Depression there had been two major 
turning points in industrial relations: the 1994 reform and the 1997 bi-partite agreement. The 
former promoted a process of bottom-up disorganized de-centralisation via opting-out clauses 
and showed the unstable character of industrial relations under the permanent threat of 
unilateral state regulation, whilst the later made clear the determination of social partners to 
build strong autonomous regulatory capacities and develop a top-down process of organized 
de-centralization through devolving clauses in collective bargaining.  
 
Contrary to the vitality exhibited by bi-partite social dialogue before the 2008 crisis, tripartite 
social dialogue proved to be much more unstable. Thus the second term (2000-2004) of the 
right wing executive headed by Mr. Aznar coincided with increasing conflict and new attempts 
at unilateral regulation of the labour market and social protection. Tripartite social dialogue 
was revitalised since 2004 with the election of the left-wing executive headed by Mr. 
Rodriguez Zapatero. The ups and down in tripartite social dialogue are certainly related to its 
late and weak degree of institutionalization. Only in 1991 a tripartite Social and Economic 
Council was created which provided a stable forum for relations amongst trade unions, 
employer organizations and the government. However its role is limited to consultations and 
as a consequence, tripartite social dialogue has always developed in a non-formal sphere. It is 
accordingly more exposed to exogenous shocks, socio-economic conditions and political 
discretion. This notwithstanding, there is no clear correlation between the colour of 
government and tripartite social dialogue (Molina and Rhodes 2011). Explanations based on 
political exchange have also figured prominently in the analysis of policy concertation and 
social dialogue in Spain (Oliet 2005). The idea behind this perspective is that in a context of 
weak institutionalization, the resources (financial, institutional or strictly political) available to 
actors determine their willingness to engage in tripartite social dialogue and its success. In a 
context of crisis and little room to manoeuvre, tripartite social dialogue will accordingly be 
under stress, as was the case in the early 1990s and the current crises.  
  
Social dialogue during the great depression has evolved along two well differentiated periods. 
The period of stimulus response in 2008-2009 was characterized by a significant involvement 
of social partners, though with little results in terms of agreements signed those years. The 
2010 debt crisis led to the adoption of a more unilateral policy making approach that meant 
the abandonment of tripartite social dialogue and the unilateral reform of the labour market 
and collective bargaining in January 2012. The only exception in this process was the January 
2011 Tripartite Social and Economic Agreement. 
 
In addition to the inherent weakness of tripartite social dialogue in Spain, several explanations 
have been provided for its collapse in the context of the Great Depression. One of the 
arguments expressed by both the employers as well as PSOE and PP executives is the little 
capacity of social dialogue to keep pace of real economic developments and be able to provide 
quick and meaningful responses. Another recurrent argument is the little efficacy of measures 
negotiated in the context of social dialogue. This is because by their very nature, negotiated 
reforms reflect the equilibrium between the positions of actors involved and are accordingly 
less effective. The limited room for manoeuvre of the executive due to fiscal policy constraints 
has also hindered the possibilities to sign tripartite agreements because the political exchange 
required to sign a tripartite agreement is less likely when there are no resources that can be 
used for compensating the ‘sacrifices’ made by the other actors. Finally, the legitimacy 
dimension of tripartite social dialogue is also important. From the point of view of input 
legitimacy, the criticism from some sectors of the population to the role of trade unions and 
employers in the context of the crisis and austerity policies have certainly reduced the 
incentives for executives to rely on this form of governance. Thus as the following section 
shows, in the case of the 2012 labour market reform the party in government expressed the 
view that the real legitimacy comes from the parliament and as a consequence, there is no 
obligation, nor need to validate agreements through social dialogue . If we add the supra-
national dimension to this picture, i.e., the mandate by the EU to undertake fiscal adjustment 
together with other reforms, we find also the perception that executives are more accountable 
regarding economic policies to supra-national actors rather than to citizens or collective actors 
representing their interests.  
 
It is nonetheless important to stress how bipartite social dialogue, which had been revitalized 
since the late 1990s, has delivered more than twenty agreements in ten years (Molina and 
Rhodes 2011). As a matter of fact, in addition to the tripartite social pact signed on February 
2011, two important bi-partite inter-confederal agreements for collective bargaining have 
been signed during the crisis, hence following the practice initiated in 2002. In addition to 
providing some general guidelines for the (re-) negotiation of collective agreements, these 
pacts have also contained guidelines for the development of bi-partite and tri-partite 
negotiations around collective bargaining and wage-setting. The prominent role of bipartite 
social dialogue has been reinforced by the emphasis placed by labour market reforms in 2010 
and 2011 on enhancing negotiated forms of adjustment and restructuring through functional 
flexibility. Thus social partners’ strategies in order to mitigate the effects of the crisis on 
employment have focused on strengthening collective bargaining capacities at company level 




Industrial Relations and Collective Bargaining 
 
One of the institutional domains where the reforms undertaken during the great recession 
have been more radical and/or profound has been industrial relations. This is paradoxical given 
first of all that the crisis’ triggers had very little to do with employment relations. Moreover, 
collective bargaining in Spain was characterized since the late 1990s by an increasing 
governability and articulation between the sector and company levels, in line with the 
recommendations of the EC (Nonell et al 2006). In this vein, the reform of industrial relations 
in 2012 has meant another turning point, similar to the one in 1994. In both cases, strong 
exogenous pressures in the context of economic recession led governments (left-wing in 1994 
and right-wing in 2012) to pass the law without the consensus of social partners. However, two 
characteristics of the most recent episode make it qualitatively different from previous ones. 
First, it goes well beyond the goal of collective bargaining decentralization contained in the 
1994 reform. Thus it not only brings back mechanisms of disorganized bottom-up 
decentralization, but it also empowers employers to unilaterally modify working conditions. 
Secondly, for the first time, a government passed a law with significant implications for 
industrial relations without any previous dialogue with social partners.  
 
Three main episodes of industrial relations reform occurred during the crisis before the one in 
2012. The first one is the Inter-Confederal Agreement on Employment and Collective 
Bargaining 2010-2012 (AENC-I) signed in February 20101. This came after the failure in 2009 to 
renew the bi-partite agreements on collective bargaining that had been signed on a yearly 
basis since 2002. Both employers and trade unions acknowledged the need for mechanisms 
allowing a quicker adjustment of in collective bargaining of issues like wages or working time. 
However, some significant differences remained regarding other important issues. One of 
them was the automatic extension of collective agreements upon expiry (the so-called 
ultraactividad), which according to employers, imposed excessive rigidities, particularly in 
times of crisis. After three months of negotiations, an agreement was reached that dealt with 
several aspects including the transformation of temporary into open ended contracts, internal 
flexibility, teleworking, wage guidelines (2010: 1%; 2011: 1-2%; 2012: 1,5-2,5%), use of opting 
out clauses and the beginning of negotiations around collective bargaining reform. 
 
Following the commitment contained in the AENC-I, trade unions and employers engaged into 
the negotiation of a reform of collective bargaining. However, no agreement was finally 
reached and the Socialist government decided to pass a law in September that same year (Law 
35/2010). The main goal of the law was to increase the possibility for companies to rely upon a 
negotiated adjustment via functional / internal flexibility without necessarily resorting to 
quantitative external adjustment. For this reason, the reform enhanced the capacity of 
company collective agreements to introduce mechanisms of internal flexibility whilst at the 
                                                             
1 See full text at 
http://www.ccoo.es/comunes/recursos/1/doc17657_Acuerdo_para_el_Empleo_y_la_Negociacion_Cole
ctiva_2010,_2011_y_2012..pdf 
same time opening more spaces to the opting out from higher level agreements on wage and 
other working conditions. One of the issues that the government introduced in the text was 
the extension of short-time working scheme clauses as a mechanism to maintain employment. 
These clauses, that had a limited use by Spanish companies, have increased during the crisis, 
though the reform does not seem to have had a significant impact and its extension and the 
use of this mechanism has followed a pattern similar to the one exhibited in other crisis 
periods (see graph 1). 
 
 
Graph 1: Number of workers affected by Short-time working schemes 
 
Source: Boletin de Estadísticas Laborales, Ministry of Labour and Emigration 
 
 
Even though trade unions agreed with the general orientation of the reform, they nonetheless 
criticised very strongly the decision of the government to regulate unilaterally. Thus the main 
logo of the general strike organised some weeks later was ‘Así No’ (not in this way), and made 
explicit reference to the form, not the content of the reform. After the general strike, bi-
partite negotiations amongst social partners resumed in the context of the 2011 Social and 
Economic Agreement2 that included a commitment by social partners to start negotiations to 
reform collective bargaining3. After four months of talks between unions and employers, 
consensus was only possible to a limited extent and no pact was accordingly signed. The 
government had urged social partners to reach an agreement and decided again to unilaterally 
regulate by approving a Royal Decree Law on Urgent Measures to Reform Collective Bargaining 
in June 2011 (Law 7/2011)4. Even though the content of the reform reflected the limited 
                                                             
2 The 2011 Social and Economic Agreement was signed by employers, trade unions and the government 
and the main content consisted in a reform of old age pensions, including an increase in pensionable 
age. 
3 See full text at 
http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/201101/28/espana/20110128elpepunac_1_Pes
_PDF.pdf 




























































consensus reached between trade unions and employers, social partners were critical as it was 
considered a new violation of their collective autonomy. The law introduced changes in the 
structure of collective bargaining by establishing a series of issues whose negotiation at 
company level has priority. Moreover, it also modified the procedures and timing to denounce 
and re-negotiate a collective agreement, with the aim of avoiding an escalation of conflict and 
speeding up the process.  
 
In January 2012, employers and trade unions signed the second inter-confederal agreement on 
Employment and Collective bargaining 2012-2014 (AENC-II)5. The objective of this bi-partite 
agreement was to bring back changes in collective bargaining and the labour market into the 
autonomous sphere of negotiations of trade unions and employer organisations. Failed 
attempts at reaching an agreement and the executive’s unilateral regulations in 2010 and 2011 
forced social partners to agree on the direction collective bargaining had to move and impede 
further attempts at unilateral intervention. The most innovative aspect contained in the AENC-
II compared to AENC-I consists in an explicit demand for the decentralization of collective 
bargaining within the framework provided by sector-level agreements. In this regard, social 
partners agreed on developing a process of organised top-down decentralisation where 
sector-level agreements must provide the rules for articulation whilst enhancing the role 
played by company-level agreements. Moreover, it also contains the obligation by collective 
agreements to include plans to develop internal flexibility by clearly distinguishing between its 
three elements: wages, working time and functions. It accordingly constitutes another step in 
the attempt to enhance internal flexibility with a view to safeguard jobs in the short term, but 
with a longer-term objective of changing the mechanisms to adjust the labour market and 
move from external (numerical) to internal (functional) flexibility.  
 
Notwithstanding the successful attempt of trade unions and employers to bring back the 
reform of collective bargaining to the field of autonomous negotiations through the AENC-II, 
the executive regulated again unilaterally and without any previous contact with social 
partners just some days later. As a matter of fact, most of the innovations and specific 
guidelines for developing internal flexibility in collective bargaining that were included in the 
bi-partite peak agreement were overlooked by the government in the 2012 labour market 
reform. This fact caused perplexity not only in trade unions but also amongst the employers 
that couldn’t understand why the government did not take into consideration the AENC-II. 
 
The reform approved by the centre-right PP government in February 2012 contained several 
modifications of regulations concerning industrial relations and collective bargaining. Probably 
the most important one has to do with the enhanced unilateral capacity of the employer to 
change working conditions. Even though the law already established this possibility in the case 
of wages, the 2012 reform extended it to other issues such as working time. Moreover, the law 
also reduced the notice period of this decision to the employee. Thus it goes beyond the de-
centralization through opting-out clauses and introduces a qualitatively new element. 
Similarly, the employer is given more capacity to decide unilaterally on issues related to 
collective redundancies. Another aspect where the law enhances the role given to the 
employer in regulating working conditions refers to the temporary non application of the 
collective agreement on a number of issues and significantly relaxes the conditions under 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/06/11/pdfs/BOE-A-2011-10131.pdf 
5 See full text at: 
http://www.ccoo.es/comunes/recursos/1/doc96566_Boletin_Oficial_del_Estado,_II_Acuerdo_para_el_
Empleo_y_la_Negociacion_Colectiva_2012,_2013_Y_2014..pdf 
which this can happen. Graph 2 shows how the reform has triggered a significant increase in 
the number of non-applications, even though the economic context was more favourable in 
2013 compared to 2012. Around 90% non-applications by company level agreements related 
to wage issues (CCNC 2013). In this vein, the employer can decide to temporarily not applying 
the terms of the collective agreement whenever the company registers falling benefits during 
six consecutive months. 
 
Graph 2: Workers Affected by the Temporary Non-Application of the Collective Agreement by 
the Employer 
 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales 
 
One of the most contested characteristics of collective bargaining in Spain, the so-called 
‘ultraactividad’ of collective agreements (the extension of the terms of a collective agreement 
even after its expiration whenever trade unions and employers failed to sign a new 
agreement) has been reformed by establishing a two year limit to negotiate a new agreement. 
In case no agreement is finally signed, workers in those companies will be covered by a higher-
level agreement and in case no agreement exists, by the terms established by law. As the law 
establishes only minimum conditions that are then improved by collective agreement, with the 
abolition of ultraactividad the reform exposed many workers to a sudden deterioration in 
working conditions (Olarte 2013).  
 
Finally, a very important issue regulated in the 2012 reform is the structure of collective 
bargaining. The reform not only confirms the priority attached to company-level agreements, 
but it also establishes the impossibility for higher-level agreements to contain clauses 
establishing the prevalence over lower level agreements. In other words, the reform reduces 
the regulatory and governance capacity of sector level agreements in the collective bargaining 
system.  
 
Trade unions condemned most of the contents of the reform as it departures from what had 
been agreed with employers in the AENC-II only some days before. Moreover, they also 
criticized the absence of any attempt at engaging in a process of social dialogue in the drafting 
of the proposal. Some employers also complained about the introduction of pure de-
centralization. In this regard, there is coincidence amongst trade unions and employers on the 
need to maintain sector-level agreements, though they differ in the degree of flexibility 














The impact of the crisis on tripartite social dialogue has been very important. In particular, it 
has taken a long time to recover from the February 2012 reform. Only in July 2014, social 
partners and the government signed a memorandum of understanding for tripartite social 
dialogue (Acuerdo de Propuestas para la Negociación Tripartita para Fortalecer el Crecimiento 
Económico y el empleo)6. It is still to be seen whether the general orientations provided in this 
document will set the foundations for developing a fruitful process of tripartite social dialogue. 
The general impression is that the repeated unilateral regulations by governments during the 
crisis have very negatively impinged upon social dialogue among unions and employers. They 
again face the task of rebuilding social dialogue and collective self-regulation, particularly at 




Section III. Impact of the Adjustment on Industrial Relations and Social Dialogue 
 
Even though it is probably too early to properly assess the institutional and long-term effects 
brought by the changes outlined in section II, there are some indications that nonetheless 
confirm their significance. The most important one refers to the capacity of collective 
bargaining to provide additional protection to workers. The 2012 reform introduced two main 
elements that limited this role. First, the capacity of the employer to unilaterally modify 
working conditions of employees as laid out in the collective agreement, as seen in the 
remarkable increase in the unilateral non-applications of collective agreements. Secondly, the 
non-extension of collective agreements upon expiry also implies that many workers may be 
left without the additional protection provided by collective agreements, and their working 
conditions will then be regulated by the legal minima established in the Workers’ Statute. 
There is some evidence pointing out to the use of delaying tactics by employers in order to let 
the collective agreements expire and blocking the development of negotiations with workers 
around a new collective agreement. However, a recent report by the tripartite National 
Advisory Board on Collective Bargaining (CCNC 2014) showed how there is a diversity of 
mechanisms used by employers and workers’ representatives to negotiate the temporary 
extension of the collective agreement upon expiry whilst engaging into the negotiation of a 
new one. Thus there is a commitment by employers and trade unions, especially at sectoral 
level, to use collective bargaining in order to alleviate some of the most disrupting effects 
(either for workers or companies) of the non extension of collective agreements. 
 
When we look at the evolution in the number of agreements signed and workers covered, we 
observe a decline as a consequence of the crisis. In the case of workers covered, the decline is 
almost entirely due to the increase in unemployment. In the case of collective agreements 
signed, it is not possible to argue with the data available that there has been a reduction in the 
number of collective agreements, as some agreements have not been registered yet and the 
data is still provisory. However, several cases have been reported of difficulties to renew many 
collective agreements. One of the reasons given is the expectation by employers of changes in 
the regulation of collective agreements that could be more favourable to their interests hence 
leading them to block negotiations. As graph 3 shows, there has been a sudden fall since 2012 
in the number of agreements signed or renewed. The crisis certainly has an effect on 
negotiating dynamics as showed by the decrease in the early 1990s in a context of another 
economic crisis. However, the size of the fall is remarkably higher in the new economic crisis. 
                                                             
6 See the agreement at 
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/serviciosdeprensa/notasprensa/Documents/Documento%20Acuerdo%20
29%20de%20julio_DEFINITIVO.pdf 
This probably reflects the existence of a number of collective agreements that have expired 
but haven’t been renewed.  
 
Graph 3: Number of Workers Covered by Collective Agreements 
 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales. Data for 2013 and 2014 is not consolidated yet 
 
However, what we can certainly confirm is that the main impact of labour market reforms 
during the crisis has been the erosion of the regulatory and protective capacity of collective 
agreements. Thus it is not so much about how many collective agreements have been signed, 
or even how many workers are formally covered by them, but to what extent those collective 
agreements provide additional effective protection to employees. Even though the 
predominance of SMEs in Spain had already been pointed out by some authors as a hindrance 
for the efficacy of collective agreements (due to the lack of workers’ representation structures 
in most of them), the changes introduced in 2012 opened up a new scenario where the 
unilateral decision to temporarily not apply the terms of collective agreements has now legal 
support. 
 
Negotiated wage increases have experienced a downward trend during the crisis, with the only 
exception of 2011 (graph 4). It can also be observed how in 2013 there is a sharper fall in 
company level negotiated wage increases compared to sector level. Even though company 
level agreements do tend to contain more moderate wage settlements compared to sector 
agreements, the 2013 figure probably reflects the changes introduced by the 2012 reform. 
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Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales 
 
 
Finally, when it comes to conflict, the imposition of austerity policies, including unilateral 
reforms of labour market, has led to several general (political) strikes affecting both the private 
and public sectors of the economy (table 1). More specifically, there have been three general 
strikes and one strike of public sector employees. In addition to this, there have been general 
strikes in some specific areas such as education, health etc. But an increase in ordinary (non 
political) conflict can also be observed in the months following the approval of the 2012 labour 
market reform. The tensions created around the passing and implementation of this law, are 
probably the main explanation for this increase. Higher conflict is accordingly a result of the 
overhaul in many aspects of the traditional bargaining framework between employers and 
trade unions, which opens up a new scenario and may contribute to a temporary increase in 
conflict. 
 
Table 1: General Strikes in Spain 2008-2012 
Date Scope Motivation Participants 
June 2010 Public Sector Against the May 2010 
austerity package 
CCOO + UGT + CSIF 
September 2010 All the economy Against the labour 
market reform and 
austerity package 
All trade unions 
January 2011 All the economy Against the Social and 
Economic Agreement 
and pension reform 
All trade unions except 
for the two largest 
confederations CCOO 
and UGT that signed the 
agreement 
March 2012 All the economy Against the labour 
market reform passed 
in February 2012 
All trade unions 





















The Great Depression has triggered an overhaul of the industrial relations edifice in Spain. The 
trend towards collective bargaining decentralization has accelerated in the context of the crisis 
and has adopted a clear bottom-up, disorganised character. Thus the 2012 meant a 
breakdown with respect to the previous episodes as it not only enhanced the regulatory 
capacity of company level agreements, but it also gave more regulatory power to employers 
whilst diminishing the regulatory capacity of sector level agreements. Other changes will 
certainly contribute to make collective bargaining a more adequate instrument to face 
economic downturns. These include mechanisms in order to facilitate and speed up the 
renewal of existing agreements, including collective dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 
The vitality exhibited by bi-partite social dialogue since the late 1990s has not impeded an 
attack to the collective autonomy of social partners as showed by the repeated unilateral 
regulations of collective bargaining by governments of both centre-left and centre-right. This 
has made clear the unstable equilibrium in industrial relations of statist varieties of capitalism. 
The threat of unilateral state regulation is always present and increases with exogenous 
shocks. As a consequence of this, social partners’ incentives to build strong self-regulation 
capacities may decrease. This will at the same time generate new demands for government 
regulation. Thus industrial relations change in MMEs will accordingly be characterised by being 
most of the times induced exogenously, state-driven and radical.  
 
However, there is some evidence point out to the resilience of pre-crisis collective bargaining 
dynamics and the capacity of social partners to adapt to the new framework. Thus for 
instance, bi-partite social dialogue has remained well alive during the crisis and has 
contributed to an increasing awareness of the need to enhance the capacity of collective 
agreements to adapt to changing conditions through internal flexibility. Moreover, the 
implementation of some of the most controversial clauses introduced by the 2012 reform is 
being negotiated, hence reducing its potentially disrupting impact. Even though it remains to 
be seen the long-term impact of recent changes, it becomes clear how in non coordinated 
economies social partners face a difficult task in order to consolidate a strong self-regulatory 
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